On really responsive rule-making? The EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations

Dr. Elaine Fahey

Senior Lecturer, The City Law School, City University London

The script

The EU and US have now completed six rounds of negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement (TTIP), the trade agreement under negotiation between the EU and US to cut trade barriers and ‘behind the borders’ barriers (technical regulations, standards, approvals) in a wide variety of sectors. It is touted as having the potential to become the global trade standard. Already, the epitaph is alleged to have been written on the Agreement. Yet while this misses the mark as to the theatre of global rule-making, on the other hand, scepticism is not unwarranted. It has at times appeared as an extraordinary experiment in rule-making1. TTIP harbours ambitions to grow as a living regulatory entity. It has become rife with controversy, for its secrecy, for its possible inclusion of the Investor Settlement Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and its impact on EU regulatory standards. Some have even tried to stop the negotiations using EU law itself, in the form of a failed European Citizens Initiative.

The history of transatlantic relations is littered with many failed attempts to integrate EU and US legal order through mutual recognition, even in very limited fields. TTIP had been poised to shake up this dynamic. It has become an exercise in ‘really responsive rule-making’. However, many questions remain about international negotiations and the standard of what is and should be ‘really responsive EU rule-making’:- I reflect on its script, production process and the cast of actors.

The production process

Most EU-US rule-making processes in the past has been conducted firmly behind closed doors, in inscrutable so-called ‘Dialogues’, in a range of fields that many will never have heard of. They traditionally privileged industry. The TTIP negotiations have marked an enormous shift in EU-US rule-making. Continue reading

Cartel Damage Claims and the so-Called “Umbrella Pricing” Under EU Competition Law: The Kone Ruling of the CJEU

Jens-Olrik Murach and Pablo Figueroa

On June 5, 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (respectively, the “EU” and the “CJEU”) issued a Ruling in relation to so-called “umbrella pricing” cartel damage actions.  These claims refer to damages allegedly suffered due to the surcharge applied by non-cartelists who, independently and rationally, adapted to a price increase resulting from a cartel by increasing their own prices.

Pursuant to the Ruling of the CJEU in Case C-557/12 Kone (“Kone”), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) preempts the EU Member States from having in place domestic regulations which “categorically exclude” umbrella pricing claims deriving from breaches of EU Competition law.

I.   Background

In February 2007, the European Commission issued a Decision imposing fines on the members of an alleged cartel in the markets for lifts and escalators.  The members of the alleged cartel included the Finnish company Kone AG.

Relying on the “umbrella effect” of the cartel, ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG (“ÖBB”), a subsidiary of the Austrian Federal Railway, brought an action before the Austrian courts against the members of the alleged cartel, including Kone AG, claiming damages.  These damages would result from ÖBB buying from third party suppliers which were not a member of the cartel at a higher price than ÖBB would have paid but for the existence of that cartel, on the ground that those third undertakings benefited from the existence of the cartel in adapting their prices to the higher level (see Kone, at § 10).

ÖBB’s action was rejected by an Austrian Court of First Instance but it was upheld by the appellate Court.  The Austrian Supreme Court (“Oberster Gerichtshof“) asked the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the issue of whether Article 101 TFEU (namely, the provision of EU law which prohibits anti-competitive agreements, the EU equivalent to § 1 Sherman Act) requires the recognition of “umbrella claims”.  This recognition would apparently be contrary to the requirements, applicable to damages claims under Austrian torts law, of “adequate causal link” between the conduct of the infringing entity and the injury and “unlawfulness”, that is, whether the provision infringed had as its object the protection of the interests of the injured person (see Kone, at § 13 to 15). Continue reading

Matteo Renzi, between the quest for “Europe’s soul” and the “assault of technocracy”

lindsethProf. Peter Lindseth

Two recent pieces in the FT (here and here) brought home the magnitude of the task currently confronting Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi as he seeks to reform a sclerotic domestic system and yet ward off complaints from supranational technocrats unsatisfied with the pace of change. The Renzi challenge can be seen as a case study in whether and to what extent charismatic political leadership in a national democracy can successfully achieve its goals in the face entrenched bureaucratic power both national and supranational. In that regard, readers may find of interest remarks I delivered last month at the Summer School on “Parliamentary Democracy in Europe” at the LUISS Guido Carli School of Government in Rome. My focus was Renzi’s recent speech before the European Parliament on 2 July 2014, viewed in relation to statements made before the Italian Chamber of Deputies and elsewhere around the same time. Renzi’s line of rhetoric on Europe—notably his quest for Europe’s “soul” and “the meaning of [its] life together”—provided a point of entry into a broader set of reflections on the current state of the integration process, its socio-political / socio-cultural underpinnings, as well as the challenge of reconciling (national) democracy and (largely but not exclusively supranational) technocracy. The full remarks can be found here (including citations), while below is an excerpt.

Renzi began [his speech of July 2d in Strasbourg] by offering congratulations to the members of the EP for their recent election. He spoke of the “great responsibility” of the EP to bring “trust and hope” (fiducia e speranza) to European institutions. But note what he did not say: He did not say that EP brought “democratic legitimacy” to European policy-making. He did say that it was “only right and politically just” for the European Council to respect “the results of the recent electoral campaign” and hence the EP’s “prerogatives” in the choice of the new Commission president. But he avoided using the language of EU “democracy” to describe this step.

Of course, I have no special access to the workings of Renzi’s mind. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that he deliberately avoided the language of democratic legitimation with regard to the EP. The prior week, in a speech before the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Renzi stated: “Those who imagine that the democratic ‘gap’ in Europe will be overcome simply by the appointment of Juncker as President of the European Commission are living on Mars.” In that earlier speech he went on to describe not only the low turnout in the European elections but also the significant percentage of the vote that went to parties hostile to the European project. From there he segued to a theme that would be central to his speech in Strasbourg the following week: “It is not enough to have a currency in common, or a President in common, or a source of funding in common.” Rather, what is needed is for Europe to “accept the idea that we have a destiny in common and values in common.” In his speech the following week before the EP, Renzi elaborated: “The real challenge confronting our continent is to find the soul of Europe, to find the profound meaning of our being together” (my emphasis).

Now I know as scholars we are not supposed to pay much attention to these sorts of rhetorical flourishes by politicians. Nevertheless, I found this entire line of discussion fascinating. Perhaps Renzi did not intend it but his reference to finding Europe’s “soul” and “the meaning of our being together” brought to mind a similar line of thinking in Ernest Renan’s famous 1882 lecture, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (“What is a Nation?”). According to Renan: “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle…. [It is] the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories [but also] present-day consent, the desire to live together … [It is] a daily plebiscite ….” In speaking of the current ills afflicting the EU, did Renzi intentionally mean to invoke this paean to liberal nationalism of the nineteenth century? After all, isn’t European integration supposed to be a “post-national” project, something designed to transcend the legacy and evils of nationalism?

Perhaps Renzi was not invoking Renan specifically, but there is much in the speech to suggest that Renzi would like nothing less than for the integration project to emulate at least some aspects of nationalism. Most importantly, Renan associated nationalism with a “large-scale solidarity”—something that Renzi might love to see replicated on a European scale in response to the Eurozone crisis.

The clearest indication was Renzi’s invocation of the famously dismissive observation of Metternich to describe Italy in 1847, in which Metternich asserted that Italy was nothing more than “a geographical expression.” For Renzi, today’s Europeans must demonstrate that that Europe is something more than a “geographical expression.” According to Renzi: “There will be no space for Europe if we remain only a dot on Google Maps. We are a community, a people, we are not a geographical expression—to use the phrase applied to Italy by a great Austrian statesman of the nineteenth century” (Metternich was not specifically named). Continue reading

EU Commission President: Who and what did we actually vote for?

Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl

“How did we vote? Did we actually vote – or did the Volk simply roll the dice?”

Niklas Luhmann‘s sarcasm in the FAZ on October 22nd 1994 referred to the Bundestag elections of that same year. Back then, the black/yellow coalition narrowly won out over its red/green counterpart. Luhmann’s commentary is not only a pleasurable read – it also contains an analysis of surprising relevance for the electoral outcome of the 2014 European elections. Luhmann argued that the differences between the two coalition blocs were minimal. One reason for this was the fact that “politicians are no longer able to support political alternatives according to their preferences, due to constraints set by our economic system”. Fundamentally, this is not much different in contemporary Europe. Certainly the party landscape is larger, more diverse and more awkward than in Germany in 1994. However, even in this contested context, no party has a promising alternative when dealing for instance with the financial markets.

What was this most recent election about? One very prominent and popular manifesto from March 9th 2014 argued the election was about nothing less than the future of Europe itself. The novelty of “different candidates running for Commission President while also representing different models of Europe”, the election of so-called Spitzenkandidaten, is seen as a quantum leap for the Union.

Miguel Maduro, Bruno de Witte and Mattias Kumm, who have developed and publicly supported the idea of electing the Commission President by the European Parliament in their policy paper The Euro-Crisis and the Democratic Governance of the Euro: Legal and Political Issues of a Fiscal Crisis, put it somewhat differently. They did not speak of competing models. Instead, according to them the direct election of the Commission president would increase the political legitimacy of the Commission, thus strengthening the institution in its new role as European crisis manager. The control over national economic and fiscal policy would be democratically legitimated and thus more easily promoted and enforced. Accordingly, it would furnish functionalist technocrats with democratic legitimization.

This understanding of the Spitzenkandidaten would surely not have motivated the citizens of Europe, especially on the so-called European periphery, to participate in the election. In this respect the manifesto was both more attractive as well as more realistic. Nonetheless, the manifesto was not able to demonstrate that the leading candidates could be the personalization of its slogans. Socialist leading candidate Martin Schulz was supposed to represent the programme of an “’alternative Europe’, one in which the market is subjected to democratic rules”. When demonizing the political alternative of “’lesser Europe’, where the market subjugates democratic rules”, the manifesto had to refer to a politician not even on the ballot: David Cameron. For the manifesto, EPP candidate Jean-Claude Juncker, now Commission President-elect did not seem to stand for anything in particular. Continue reading

Access to the criminal case file: French example shows potential impact of Roadmap Directives

menottesJessica Finelle and Alex Tinsley

Yesterday, 2 June 2014, was the deadline for implementation of Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings (‘the Directive’). This is the second of three directives adopted further to the 2009 Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights, the EU’s ambitious project to strengthen mutual trust between Member States’ judicial authorities by protecting criminal defence rights through EU law. The others were the Interpretation and Translation Directive, and the Access to a Lawyer Directive (together, the ‘Roadmap Directives’).

Designed to build upon the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), these measures come full of promise: the citizen gets new, directly effective rights and the criminal court becomes a frontline enforcer EU law, potentially at the expense of inadequate national laws; the criminal judge can get help from Luxembourg, while the case is still live, lessening recourse to Strasbourg with the delayed justice this entails. That is the theory. To explore the potential impact on the ground, this post looks at the ongoing discussion surrounding access to the case file during garde à vue (police custody) in France.

Accès au dossier: the back story

Wind back to 2010. The European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) had given its important judgment in Salduz v. Turkey – establishing the right of access to a lawyer at the police station as an essential guarantee of Article 6 ECHR – and the Member States were scrambling to comply. The UK Supreme Court’s Cadder judgment found the Scottish system of police custody contrary to Salduz principles. In France, the Conseil Constitutionnel’s landmark ruling of 30 July 2010 found the garde à vue regime – whereby lawyers could not attend interrogations, despite the potential for suspects’ statements to be used against them later – unconstitutional. Urgent reforms followed in both jurisdictions.

For French lawyers, this was a watershed but only a first step. From their perspective, although they can now attend police interrogations, their presence remains somewhat ornamental. The relevant provision of the criminal procedure code (as in force until 1 June) entitled them to access the procès-verbal, the written record of the suspect being informed that they are in custody, the nature and time of the alleged offence, and their rights. But the underlying materials (e.g. the complaint, phone transcripts, testimonies, etc.) are unavailable. Without these, lawyers feel unable to advise clients usefully. Lawyers in Spain, who face the same problem, share their opinion.

The ECHR has not proved helpful in challenging this. The ECtHR had stated in its Dayanan judgment, shortly after Salduz, that the lawyer’s role at the police station involved a whole gamut of advisory and practical activities, and the brief Sapan judgment seemed to suggest explicitly that a lawyer needed to see the file to advise effectively. One brave court of appeal in Agen even followed this line in 2011, but the Cour de cassation was having none of it. And in a decision of 18 November 2011, the Conseil Constitutionnel confirmed that the new garde à vue regime was fine: police station proceedings were not part of the judicial process and did not call for equality of arms.

Nor does the arrested person derive much assistance from Article 5 ECHR. True, Article 5(4) entitles them to effective judicial review of detention; this challenge, as the ECtHR has often stated (para 124), should ensure ‘equality of arms’ and that means key documents need disclosing. But this applies only once the person is produced in court; in the shady confines of the police station – where confessions are so easily made and the outcome of a criminal case is often determined – it has no relevance.

Article 7(1) of the Directive

unlockedEnter Article 7(1) of the Directive. The idea is familiar: it requires Member States to provide a person deprived of liberty with access to documents essential for contesting the lawfulness of detention. But crucially, it speaks of a person ‘arrested or detained at any stage in criminal proceedings’. For the Paris Bar, it is obvious that this means an arrested person (or their lawyer) needs access to the police file before interrogation, so that they can contest the allegations – the grounds for their arrest – and advise the client on the best course of action.

Mobilising the defence

As with all Roadmap provisions, whether this one has an impact depends on the use made of it in practice. The Council of the EU, worn out from negotiating the measures, has emphasised the need for training to make them bite (para 12). Fair Trials International recently launched a project with five EU partners to train 240 defence lawyers across the EU with this in mind. National bars and defence associations, like the Asociación Libre de Abogados in Spain, are also organising themselves around these directives. Among them, the Paris Bar is in the maillot jaune. Continue reading

Adieu and Farewell to the Data Retention Directive

Anita PicAnita Davies

The European Union is all too often portrayed as a creature defined by over-regulation – be it the infamous “bendy banana” rules or the great chocolate debate. It is easy (and sometimes politically convenient) to forget that the EU and CJEU can serve to protect individuals from overt (and covert) state regulation. As of a CJEU decision this week to annul the Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC), it will be very difficult for the Home Secretary, Teresa May, to push through the Communications Data Bill (also known as the “Snooper’s Charter”).

The bill was abandoned in May 2013 following opposition from the Lib Dems, but has shown signs of resurfacing. The bill would give police and security services access, without a warrant, to details of all online communication in the UK – such as the time, duration, originator and recipient, and the location of the device from which it was made. The bill depends however, on operators being obliged to store customers’ details and records. The data retention directive obliged companies to retain data and information of citizens using electronic communications networks – but now that it has been annulled the responsibility of operators to retain data is far more ambiguous.

The CJEU decision resulted from proceedings taking place in Ireland and Austria – where challenges had been mounted regarding the legality of national legislative and administrative measures concerning the retention of data. The Court ruled on Wednesday that the purpose of the Data Retention Directive, i.e. ensuring that communications data was available in order to investigate and fight serious crime, was compatible with the European Rights framework. However, the Directive itself entailed a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data (Articles 7 and 8 of the CFREU), without that interference being limited to what was strictly necessary.

The Court noted that the data being retained enabled:

“very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons and the social environments frequented by them” [§27].

Given the potential conclusions the Court found that:

“The EU legislation in question must lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of the measure in question and imposing minimum safeguards so that the persons whose data have been retained have sufficient guarantees to effectively protect their personal data against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and use of that data” [§54].

The Directive lacked such precise rules and appropriate safeguards.

In particular the Court objected to the fact that the Directive did not discriminate between individuals. The Directive covers all individuals, all means of electronic communication and all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective of fighting against serious crime. The Directive also fails (somewhat surprisingly given its purpose) to define the notion of “serious crime”. The Court found that the data retention period (6 to 24 months) was too generic and that the Directive did not require that the data be retained within the EU itself. Continue reading

Case Comment: CD v ST and Z v A Government Department & Ors (C-167/12 and C-363/12)

Michèle Finck, University of Oxford

Human procreation is not longer what it used to be. While medical research has created a number of mechanisms that allow people to engage in sexual intimacy without a resulting pregnancy, it also allows those wishing to procreate but who are unable to do so biologically to have children. IVF and surrogacy in many ways challenge our conception of human procreation. Naturally, the law needs to adapt to these changes.  Surrogacy in particular however raises a number of value-laden questions, which complicates the law’s response to these medical avenues. It is thus not surprising that no homogenous position exists between Member States on this issue.

In the CD and Z cases, the CJEU had to pronounce itself on how to reconcile surrogacy with an existing legal framework on maternity leave that did not account for motherhood resulting from that mechanism. More precisely, it was faced with the question of whether a mother who did not give birth to her own child, born via a surrogate, has a right to maternity leave under EU law. Family law is not a EU competence. Maternity leave is, however, regulated by the Pregnant Workers Directive (PWD) and some aspects arising out of motherhood and employment are addressed by the Sex Discrimination Directive. In Mayr, the CJEU had already clarified that the Sex Discrimination Directive is applicable to workers undergoing IVF that have not yet been successful.

In CD and Z, the Grand Chamber established that, as a matter of EU law, only women who themselves give birth to the child can benefit from maternity leave. Two Advocates General, Wahl and Kokott, issued opinions and came to opposed conclusions. The Court followed Advocate General Wahl in its judgment. Applying Mayr, it found that the PWD only applies to women who are in fact pregnant. The Sex Discrimination Directive was found not to be applicable either as the commissioning mother of a surrogacy agreement would be in the same position as a commissioning father. Having found that the question fell outside of the ambit of EU law, the CJEU also found the Charter of Fundamental Rights to be inapplicable. In the Z judgment, the CJEU further clarified that the Framework Equality Directive and its provisions on disabilities do not apply to women unable to become or carry out a pregnancy as the directive only targets disabilities that render a worker’s involvement in professional life more burdensome, which is not the case for medical conditions that prevent women from getting pregnant or carrying out a pregnancy. Continue reading

The Commission gets the point – but not necessarily the instruments

european-union-flags-at-t-0021Jan-Werner Müller

This week the European Commission issued a Communication about a new framework for protecting the rule of law within EU Member States.[1]  Is this the long hoped for mechanism that allows the EU to deal with internal threats to liberal democracy (the democratic deficits within Member States, so to speak) effectively?  The clear-cut answer is: yes and no.  The Commission has evidently understood that attempts systematically to undermine rule of law principles require a different response than individual infringement proceedings.  Depending on the circumstances, a structured process of naming and shaming which is now available to the Commission might work.  But if it doesn’t, then the Commission will remain just as helpless as before: no new sanction mechanisms are envisaged (and, to be fair, none might be feasible without treaty change).  In that sense, the new framework formalizes — or, in the words of Commission President Barroso, “consolidates” – the Commission’s de facto approach in recent years.  This is not a trivial achievement; and it’s probably the most the Commission could do on the basis of existing law and with available institutions such as the Fundamental Rights Agency.  It may well deter some governments.  But for illiberal national politicians determined to go head to head with the Commission, there is in the end still only Article 7 TEU – and that remains as difficult to put into effect as before.

The Commission’s initiative comes against the background of threats to liberal democracy in Hungary and Romania since about 2010 — and an acute sense among many observers (and also among political actors) that the Union has been ill-equipped to deal with a challenge one might call “constitutional capture.”  Constitutional capture is different from pervasive corruption (a major problem still in Bulgaria and Romania, for instance); but it is also different from individual rights violations, grave as the latter might be.  Constitutional capture aims at systematically weakening checks and balances and, in the extreme case, making genuine changes in power exceedingly difficult.  Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán actually passed a new constitution for his country (a case of formal constitutional capture); his Romanian counterpart Victor Ponta, in the summer of 2012, blatantly tried to disable checks and balances (the constitutional court in particular) to get rid of his political arch-enemy, the President of Romania (this being a matter of attempting an informal constitutional capture).

In both cases, the Commission got into a direct confrontation with the respective national governments.  While the EU arguably helped to avoid the worst, the experience seemed to point to a significant weakness of the Commission as a guardian of the treaties: it could take governments to court for individual infringements of EU law, but it proved incapable of addressing systematic attempts to undermine the rule of law.  In some cases, it could not “read” certain laws for what they were, but had to reinterpret them in an EU framework such that their real political meaning was officially missed.  When Orbán’s government effectively decapitated the Hungarian judiciary by drastically lowering the retirement age of judges, the EU sued Hungary for age discrimination.  Brussels won its case, but the judges were never re-instated; the political situation remained more or less as Orbán’s government wanted it.       Continue reading

Does Germany need a political questions doctrine?

CormacCormac Mac Amhlaigh

The German Federal Constitutional Court’s (GFCC) recent decision on the (il)legality of the ECB’s bond-buying practices is the latest in what can only by now be described as a slew of cases from the Court since its 2009 Lisbon decision on questions which involve the German basic law but have an arguably disproportionate reverberation across Europe and particularly the European integration project. In fact, the OMT the decision itself, whereby the Court expressed doubts about the legality of the ECB’s bond-buying practices, but before making a definitive determination on the question, made a preliminary reference on the question to the CJEU, in a sense represents the making good on previous promises by the Court in Maastricht, Lisbon and Honeywell, where it threated to monitor the activities of the European institutions to ensure that they did not stray beyond the powers bestowed upon them in the treaties, and thereby vicariously break the German Constitution, (Maastricht and Lisbon) but would make a preliminary reference to the CJEU for its input into whether the activities of EU institutions are lawful before making a final determination on the point itself. (Honeywell)

The OMT decision has attracted much commentary and criticism in both the media and the blogosphere which I will not add to it here. Nor will I try to predict the future as to what Luxembourg’s response will be, nor Karlsruhe’s response to Luxembourg’s response (although it will be interesting to see what Luxembourg makes of a preliminary reference from a national Court which comes with a threat to ignore its opinion attached).  Rather, this latest case in the recent slew, and the occasion of the first preliminary reference from the GFCC in the fifty plus years of European integration, gives occasion, I think, to critically reflect upon the Court’s approach to politically sensitive issues involving the European integration process. 

To a student or teacher of British constitutional law, with its (however threadbare) doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, one never ceases to be amazed by the extent to which the GFCC gets its hands dirty by wading into the heart of German political life, adjudicating upon high-profile and sensitive political issues such as the conduct of German foreign policy and the management of security threats, to the point of second-guessing the activities of the executive and legislature.  This fearless attitude to the separation of powers has resulted in some remarkable decisions in the past (see Franck for an excellent overview), and some, quite frankly, dubious political theory on the part of the court which was on full display in its Lisbon decision.    However, what stands out is the fact that Court seems to unquestioningly assume the propriety of its activities and the complete absence of any doctrine or criteria to filter out particular controversies which may be judged too politically sensitive for the Court to make a ruling.  Courts in many (if not most) other jurisdictions, tend to side-step heavily political matters through the savvy use of admissibility requirements such as rules on locus standi or the development of judicially fashioned doctrines on ‘political questions’ or justiciability. Continue reading

Barking vs. Biting: Understanding the German Constitutional Court’s OMT reference … and its implications for EU Reform

lindsethProf. Peter Lindseth

I find myself in familiar territory.  Just as with the ESM Ruling of September 2012, some of the insta-commentary on a decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) on the Eurozone crisis calls for a response. At issue in September 2012 was the claim that the GFCC’s refusal to issue a preliminary injunction against the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was evidence of “the Court’s weakness in EU matters.” At issue now is the idea that the Court’s decision this past Friday to refer a question to the CJEU – on the compatibility of the ECB’s OMT program with the treaties – is somehow an “abdication,” indeed “nothing less than a surrender of sovereignty by Germany’s highest court.”

Commentators much closer to as well as more knowledgeable of these matters have already weighed in on this over-reaction. I’d still like to offer some additional reflections, not merely to add what I hope will be some context to Friday’s decision, but also to shed some light on the Court’s strategy in the “game” in which it inescapably finds itself. Finally, I’d like to suggest that the Court’s ruling has major implications for the process of EU reform that David Cameron has been struggling to energize. As I’ll explain in the conclusion to this post (apologies in advance for its length), it is hard to envision any outcome of Friday’s decision that will not compel the Angela Merkel’s government to undertake reform, including treaty changes.  This presents an opportunity for the British government but only if it’s prepared to accept that European reform must include not merely “less” Europe, but also “more,” including possibly an expanded mandate for the ECB to explicitly embrace OMT.

Continue reading