News

We thought we would share the excellent news that our friend and fellow Matrix member Takis Tridimas has been appointed Chair of European Law at King’s College London.  He will take up his position in January 2014.  Many congratulations, Takis!

In other news, we have been asked to give a plug for the new Working Paper series of the Swedish Competition Authority, which we are very happy to do: it looks like a great initiative.

Finally, do think about attending the joint UKAEL/ISEL conference taking place on Friday 21 June, organised by our good friends Philippa Watson and Donogh Hardiman: it promises to be an interesting and topical event.

The UK Immigration Bill and EU law

immigration bill and EU lawDr Iyiola Solanke

My government will bring forward a bill that further reforms Britain’s immigration system. The bill will ensure that this country attracts people who will contribute and deters those who will not.’

Every government in the post-WWII period has promised to reform the immigration system. Fortunately words have been chosen carefully – none promise to improve it. In times past, governments have tried to gain support for stricter immigration controls with a ‘sweetener’, usually in the form of simultaneous promises to improve integration. This trend is visible in the Queens Speech of May 8th, but the tone is quite different: previously, equality was promoted as a right; for the Coalition ‘fairness’ is a reward for those who ‘work hard’. In short, the Coalition ‘is committed to a fairer society where aspiration and responsibility are rewarded.’

Yet this fair treatment does not extend to immigrants who the Coalition plan to subject to further unfair treatment at the hands of private landlords. The intention is to impose upon landlords a requirement to check the immigration status of tenants or face heavy fines. It is not clear which of the above reform goals this is designed to address: it seems to be a general measure to disseminate throughout society a message of ‘crimmigration’ – the criminalization of immigration whereby those who cross borders are per se regarded as a security threat and subjected to constant policing and monitoring.

Many have already questioned how this duty will work, given that there is no current register of the millions of private landlords in the country. Why should they make the effort to comply, even with the threat of fines? In order to make such sanctions effective they will have to be closely enforced; surely it will undermine the Conservative goal of reducing ‘red tape’ to introduce the necessary enforcement regime? Furthermore, given that discrimination on the grounds of nationality has been prohibited under EU law since 1957, can the government introduce a measure which explicitly targets non-nationals, including those arriving from the European Union?

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Cyprus … or Why the ‘No-Demos Problem’ Defines the Policy Response to the Eurozone Crisis

lindsethProf. Peter Lindseth

Mervyn King’s now almost legendary quip about the global financial crisis—that global banks are ‘international in life, but national in death’—applies with even greater force to the Eurozone crisis.  And the consequences are increasingly devastating for European Monetary Union (EMU), as the unfolding drama in Cyprus well demonstrates.

In each stage of the Eurozone crisis—Cyprus simply being the most recent—we have been reminded that Europe’s banks, while purportedly ‘European’ in life (and allowed to grow, regardless of location, to an apparently ‘European’ scale), are very much national in their agonistic struggles to survive, ultimately dependent on national resources (or, in the case of Cyprus, also their depositors themselves).  When viewed relative to national resources—that is, access to capital to resolve/recapitalize or even just to insure deposits—many Eurozone banks (not just those in Cyprus) are potentially bloated and dangerous monstrosities, posing huge systemic risks to the EMU as currently constituted. Bailouts coming from the likes of the EFSF or ESM—channeled as they are through national governments, subject to strict conditionality—do not change this conclusion.  In fact, by ending up on national balance sheets and thus massively expanding national debts, these ‘bailouts’ only exacerbate the problem.

European leaders stated last June that they wanted to break the ‘the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns’.  Ever since, however, the core countries have done seemingly everything they could to perpetuate the ‘sovereign-bank link’.  Their actions have ensured that the entire cost of the EMU’s flawed design is born by the countries in the periphery, via austerity, the expansion of national debt, and now potentially the destruction of peripheral banking through depositor bail-ins and capital controls. There has, in other words, been no recognition of the fault that all Eurozone countries share in the flawed design of the EMU, or of the concomitant obligation to pool resources to solve the devastating problem of ‘legacy costs’.  Therein—as the innumerable advocates of a genuine European banking union have pointed out—lies the true heart of the Eurozone crisis. Europe will apparently get some kind of single regulatory supervisor for at least part of its banking sector.  But what it really needs, as so many recognize, is a common resolution mechanism and deposit guarantee scheme backed by the full fiscal capacity of the Eurozone as a whole (i.e., unshackled from the limitations of any single member state).

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Original Sin: the EU tampering with the right to property in Cyprus is an unprecedented departure from EU norms and shared constitutional rights

Anastasios A. Antoniou

The facts are well-settled by now and the majority of us know that on the evening of 15/3/13, Eurozone finance ministers agreed on an extraordinary course of action in response to Cyprus’ request for a bail-out of the State and its banking sector, both on the brink of apparent collapse. The political agreement reached at the ministers’ Eurogroup configuration, seeks to impose a levy on deposits with Cypriot banks, catching both Cypriot and foreign depositors (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Decision’).

Developments are of course constantly unfolding. Following fierce reactions to the Decision, the Eurogroup held an urgent teleconference on 18/3/13, resulting in a statement by its president, Jeroen Dijsselbloem. The statement sought to assure that deposits under EUR100.000 would be fully guaranteed in what is presented as an upholding of the Eurogroup’s ‘view’ that ‘small depositors should be treated differently from large depositors’. The issue is that the Eurogroup never expressed such a view in the first place. Nor did it bother itself with revisiting the various legal anomalies emanating from what it wants to present as a political decision enjoying the consensus of all Eurozone member states, but has in fact been a catastrophic step, irrespective of whether it is eventually passed into law by the Cypriot Parliament. Continue reading

The Cyprus Bailout, Deposit Guarantees, and the Single Market (Updated)

lindsethProf. Peter Lindseth

 [This is a slightly updated and modified version of a post that appeared on europaeus|law over the weekend.  It is cross-posted here with permission.]

We’re all monitoring the intense fallout from the announcement by the Eurogroup that the Cyprus bailout will be conditioned on an “upfront one-off stability levy” on deposits in Cypriot banks.  The levy – 9.9% on bank deposits exceeding 100,000 euros and 6.7% on anything below that – will take place on Tuesday after a bank holiday on Monday.

There will no doubt be much more to be said about this in the coming days and weeks, but we note the general expectation that the levy, as structured, will hit small depositors in Cyprus banks especially hard.  Moreover, we want to point out the potential impact that the bailout conditions will have on the single market, notably harmonized deposit guarantee schemes.  As Open Europe asked on its blog:

Does this move break EU rules on capital controls and/or deposit guarantees? As noted above, it seems that depositors will be blocked from withdrawing their funds from banks. For other EU depositors this surely amounts to a form of capital control – strictly forbidden under the EU Treaty. Furthermore, as Sharon Bowles MEP has been tweeting, this move makes a mockery of the current EU rules on deposit guarantees below €100,000. The Eurozone may protest that the bank shares given in exchange are of the same value, but this is a very thin argument. Either of these issues could be challenged at the European Court of Justice.”

Bowles, a Lib-Dem MEP and chair of the EP’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, has now issued a press release entitled “The Cyprus bailout deal is a disaster for EU rules andSingle Market principles“.  She writes:

“This grabbing of ordinary depositors’ money is billed as a tax, so as to try and circumvent the EU’s deposit guarantee laws. It robs smaller investors of the protection they were promised. If this were a bank, they would be in court for mis-selling.

“The lesson here is that the EU’s Single Market rules will be flouted when the Eurozone, ECB and IMF says so. At a time when many are greatly concerned that the creation of the ‘Banking Union’, giving the ECB unprecedented power, will demote the priorities of the Single Market, we see it here in action.

“Deposit guarantees were brought in at a maximum harmonising level so that citizens across the EU would not have incentive to move funds from country to country. That has been blown apart.

“What else will be blown apart when convenient? All the capital requirements we have slaved over, what about the new recovery and resolution rules? What does this mean for confidence in cross-border banking and resolution and preventing the fragmentation of the banking sector?

“When the dust has settled on this deal, which I hope it never does, we will see that the Single Market has been sold down the river for a shoddy price. All the worse as the consequences for Cyprus of the Greek bond haircuts were obvious.”

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The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): brief update on a winter of discontent

can-eu2-300x192Armand de Mestral

[This post was first published on the europaeuslaw blog (in which our good friend Peter Lindseth is involved) and is reproduced here with thanks.]

The CETA negotiations, which were first expected to be concluded over a year ago, have continued to drag on through the summer, the autumn and now even the winter. It took Canada a long time to decide that it wanted the CETA and even longer to convince the EU to negotiate. Now, when both sides really want the CETA, it is proving harder to get than either expected despite the obvious advantages of liberalising trade between the two parties.

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“Constitutional Revenge” in Hungary

This post originally appeared on Paul Krugman’s blog on The New York Times and is cross-posted here with permission.
One year ago, Hungary’s slide from a multiparty democracy into a one-party state was all over the headlines.    The European Union responded, threatening sanctions.  The Council of Europe (keeper of the European Convention on Human Rights) repeatedly rapped Hungary’s knuckles for violating European norms on democracy and the rule of law.   The United States expressed concern.    The forint (Hungary’s currency) dramatically weakened, even against the weakening Euro.
One year is a long time in politics and the current one-party Fidesz government has simply waited out the storm.   Sure enough, the European Union has gone back to business as usual, even increasing Hungary’s budget allocation.  The Council of Europe recently certified that Hungary is now compliant with a number of European standards.    The US is still concerned, but more quietly.  And the forint has started to recover from its late 2011 spike against the Euro.    It appears that Hungary is once again a normal country – or at least a tolerated one.
The world has relaxed because the Hungarian government appeared to modify some of the most offending reforms after pressure from the European Union, particularly with regard to the appointment of judges and media regulation. It also seemed that the Hungarian Constitutional Court was doing its job to keep the government in line.  Contrary to all predictions (including mine), the Constitutional Court has spent the last several months striking down many of the most worrisome laws passed by the Fidesz government.
The Court declared unconstitutional the law that arbitrarily lowered the retirement age of judges.  The Court nullified the law that made it a crime to be homeless in Hungary.  The Court quashed the requirement that students on state-provided financial aid remain in the country after graduation.  The Court voided on technical grounds an earlier constitutional amendment that handed power to the head of the National Judicial Office and to the chief public prosecutor to assign any case to any court, extended the old statutes of limitations for communist-era crimes, and established a new voter registration scheme.  And then the Court declared the voter registration scheme substantively unconstitutional as well.      Just this week, the Court declared unconstitutional the law that banned display of extremist symbols including the red star and the swastika, following prior decisions from the European Court of Human Rights.  And the Court declared unconstitutional parts of the law that removed the official legal status from more than 300 churches.
Even though the government had cut the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, changed the system for electing judges, expanded the bench and packed it with party loyalists, Court President Péter Paczolay has been able to skillfully mobilize bare majorities to hand setbacks to the government.  These strong decisions have honored basic rights and defended important constitutional principles, often agreeing with petitions sent to the Court by the surprisingly active Ombudsman Máté Szabó.
But the government is now seeking revenge for the various defeats it has suffered by introducing into the Parliament a 15-page constitutional amendment that reverses its losses.   The mega-amendment is a toxic waste dump of bad constitutional ideas, many of which were introduced before and nullified by the Constitutional Court or changed at the insistence of European bodies.    The new constitutional amendment (again) kills off the independence of the judiciary, brings universities under (even more) governmental control, opens the door to political prosecutions, criminalizes homelessness, makes the recognition of religious groups dependent on their cooperation with the government and weakens human rights guarantees across the board.  Moreover, the constitution will now buffer the government from further financial sanctions by permitting it to take all fines for noncompliance with the constitution or with European law and pass them on to the Hungarian population as special taxes, not payable by the normal state budget.

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Breaking the Sovereign-Bank Link…Not

Prof. Peter Lindseth

This can be brief. Readers may recall how, with great fanfare, the June 2012 European Council Summit (or, more specifically, the Euro Area Summit) announced that it was ‘imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns’. This raised the possibility that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) might be used to recapitalize distressed banks, an idea that the summit conclusions specifically discussed. Peripheral countries were obviously overjoyed at the prospect that they might be relieved on the fiscal burden of recapitalization, thus breaking the dreaded ‘sovereign-bank link’ that were driving them into insolvency.

As many readers know, disappointment soon followed.  In a joint statement in September (previously discussed on this blog here), the finance ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland made clear that, in their view, ‘the ESM can [only] take direct responsibility of problems that occur’ after a country has relinquished fiscal control under an ESM bailout and supervision memorandum. Otherwise, ‘legacy assets should be under the responsibility of national authorities’.

So the announcement this week, that Eurozone finance ministers are considering whether to cap the total amount of direct assistance for bank recapitalization at €80 billion, should probably not come as a surprise.  As Reuters reports:

German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said the ESM should ideally not be used at all and stressed that funds for banks were limited already.

“The ESM is primarily there in order not to be used, but to create confidence, and for that it needs a certain level of lending capacity,” Schaeuble told reporters after a meeting of euro zone finance ministers.

“Therefore what can be used for banking capitalisation is limited anyway, especially as we know that the funds used for banking recapitalisation must be backed by more capital.”

Commenting on a similar report in the FAZ, Wolfgang Münchau noted on his newsletter (alas, sub. req.): Schaeuble’s position ‘contains a whole number of outrages. It is clear, by now, that the June EU summit’s statement to separate the sovereign and banking risks is currently being turned into a straight-forward lie …. An €80bn allocation could be used up by a single bank rescue’.  Little more need be said, apart from quoting a previous statement by Münchau in the FT last week, noting ‘the lack of political will to sort out the banking mess, which is at the heart of the eurozone crisis. Instead, governments are seeking refuge in symbolic gestures’.

Interdependence, Political Will, and Morality: Banking Union Version

10-lindseth-008 (cropped  touched)Prof. Peter Lindseth

In reflecting on the muddled and (to many observers) disappointing outcome of last week’s European Council summit on banking union—‘yes’ to a not-insignificant Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) within the European Central Bank (ECB) but ‘no’ to any significant fiscal shock absorber in the form of resolution fund or common deposit-guaranty scheme—I couldn’t help but think of the late, great Alan Milward, perhaps the most influential of all historians of European integration.

As many readers will know, Milward was the author of the classic history of the origins of the integration process, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (1992; 2d. 2000).  And it was Milward, perhaps more than any other observer of European integration, who consistently reminded us that integration has always been a political choice rather than an inexorable consequence of growing ‘interdependence’ or some of other functional factor.  Because integration has been a political choice, its direction has also never been beyond political negotiation or even outright resistance or rejection. This insight is important to keep in mind as we reflect on the outcome of last week’s summit on banking union.

Compelling functional demands, such as managing interdependence or maintaining Europe’s geopolitical influence on the global stage, undoubtedly feed the process of European integration, Milward acknowledged.  But these demands do not necessarily determine the course of integration in a linear, strongly causal sense. Explanations of the process relying primarily on such functional explanations, most importantly the growing interdependence of the European economy, were, from Milward’s historical perspective, ‘shallow and implausible’ (ERNS, p.7).   Continue reading