Cyprus … or Why the ‘No-Demos Problem’ Defines the Policy Response to the Eurozone Crisis

lindsethProf. Peter Lindseth

Mervyn King’s now almost legendary quip about the global financial crisis—that global banks are ‘international in life, but national in death’—applies with even greater force to the Eurozone crisis.  And the consequences are increasingly devastating for European Monetary Union (EMU), as the unfolding drama in Cyprus well demonstrates.

In each stage of the Eurozone crisis—Cyprus simply being the most recent—we have been reminded that Europe’s banks, while purportedly ‘European’ in life (and allowed to grow, regardless of location, to an apparently ‘European’ scale), are very much national in their agonistic struggles to survive, ultimately dependent on national resources (or, in the case of Cyprus, also their depositors themselves).  When viewed relative to national resources—that is, access to capital to resolve/recapitalize or even just to insure deposits—many Eurozone banks (not just those in Cyprus) are potentially bloated and dangerous monstrosities, posing huge systemic risks to the EMU as currently constituted. Bailouts coming from the likes of the EFSF or ESM—channeled as they are through national governments, subject to strict conditionality—do not change this conclusion.  In fact, by ending up on national balance sheets and thus massively expanding national debts, these ‘bailouts’ only exacerbate the problem.

European leaders stated last June that they wanted to break the ‘the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns’.  Ever since, however, the core countries have done seemingly everything they could to perpetuate the ‘sovereign-bank link’.  Their actions have ensured that the entire cost of the EMU’s flawed design is born by the countries in the periphery, via austerity, the expansion of national debt, and now potentially the destruction of peripheral banking through depositor bail-ins and capital controls. There has, in other words, been no recognition of the fault that all Eurozone countries share in the flawed design of the EMU, or of the concomitant obligation to pool resources to solve the devastating problem of ‘legacy costs’.  Therein—as the innumerable advocates of a genuine European banking union have pointed out—lies the true heart of the Eurozone crisis. Europe will apparently get some kind of single regulatory supervisor for at least part of its banking sector.  But what it really needs, as so many recognize, is a common resolution mechanism and deposit guarantee scheme backed by the full fiscal capacity of the Eurozone as a whole (i.e., unshackled from the limitations of any single member state).

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Kadi II

Conor Gearty

Yves Bot had a long career as a senior French prosecutor behind him when in 2006 he joined the European Court of Justice as an Advocate General.  It has fallen to him to provide an advisory opinion in the seemingly interminable Kadi case, now winding its way back to the Court some five years after it first generated headlines, making the court (and a predecessor of Bot, Miguel Maduro) into near-celebrities in legal and human rights circles.

But why is Kadi going on and on?

The first decision in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (on 3 September 2008) made such dramatic news because it as good as disapplied United Nations sanctions against suspected terrorists within the EU legal space.  As Advocate General Bot puts it ‘[i]n essence, the Court held that the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle that all EU acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal remedies established by that Treaty’ [para 16].

Strong stuff.

So strong, the Court held back from immediate implementation of its ruling.  A flurry of activity followed. Kadi was sent reasons why he was on the UN blacklist, he commented, and the Commission then issued a fresh regulation keeping him where he was but boasting in the recitals of how inclusive they had been in this new decision-making process.  Its regulation was backdated to 2002 so as to provide no chink of light for Kadi so far as getting at his funds was concerned.  In further correspondence the Commission said that the ECJ ruling did not require it to disclose any of the evidence underpinning the reasoning behind the blacklisting.

So Kadi I was great for all the human rights and civil liberties people – but not for Kadi.

Hence Kadi II. Continue reading

Reforming Air Passenger Rights in the European Union

261Dr Jeremias Prassl

Fellow, St John’s College, University of Oxford

Commission Proposal [COM(2013) 130] for a Regulation amending Regulation 261/2004

The enactment of Regulation 261/2004 on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights has been one of the most successful areas of EU action in the field of consumer protection. At the same time, its provisions have shown their potential to impose significant additional cost on operators, thus leading to persistent compliance problems as airlines repeatedly challenge the validity and interpretation of the Regulation. On March 13, 2013 the European Commission finally heeded calls for reform, putting forward a proposal for a new Regulation to amend and extend the existing regime.

Proposed Changes

There are two broad aims pursued by the Commission’s proposals: the clarification and fine-tuning of the existing Regulation 261/2003, and the introduction of a suite of new passenger rights, underpinned by measures aimed at ensuring the effective application of air carriers’ obligations. The first part of this post sets out the key changes, in particular where the proposals relate to existing provisions as interpreted by the Court. Continue reading

Akerberg and Melloni: what the Court said, did and may have left open

John Morijn

With Akerberg and Melloni the CJEU issued two important judgments on 26 February 2013. After a first post about Akerberg, in this second part John considers Melloni and the Court’s application of article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Melloni was about an Italian citizen whose extradition to Italy was ordered by a Spanish court in 1996. He fled while released on bail and so escaped surrender to the Italian authorities. In 1997 he was tried in absentia by an Italian court and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for bankruptcy fraud. After resurfacing in Spain in 2008, Mr. Melloni was arrested by the police. At the constitutional court he challenged his impending surrender to il bel paese which in the meantime was based on a European Arrest Warrant (EAW), arguing it would violate his right under article 24(2) of the Spanish constitution not to be tried in absentia. The constitutional court, which had previously upheld a similar appeal under the first version of the EAW Framework Decision (FD) (2002/584) in a case concerning a request from Romanian authorities after an in absentia trial there, noted that the EU legislative arrangements had changed in the meantime. In particular,  FD 2009/299 had added wording (article 4a) to FD 2002/584 precisely on the point of under which conditions executing judicial authorities could refuse to execute an EAW if the person did not appear in person at the resulting in the decision. This led the constitutional court to ask, essentially, (1) whether the wording of article 4a (stating executing judicial authorities “may” refuse to execute an EAW issued, unless one of four scenarios is present) precludes national authorities from adding the condition that the conviction should be open tot review in the scenarios specified, (2) if yes, whether such preclusion would  actually be in line with articles 47 and 48(2) CFR, and (3) if so, whether article 53 CFR would then still allow for a higher national constitutional standard to be applied.  The Court answered the first two questions in the affirmative, relying in particular on its earlier ruling in Radu (see the previous EUtopia Law blog by Anita Davies here for convincing criticism of the Court’s approach). I will focus the discussion here on the article 53 CFR-point. Continue reading

Original Sin: the EU tampering with the right to property in Cyprus is an unprecedented departure from EU norms and shared constitutional rights

Anastasios A. Antoniou

The facts are well-settled by now and the majority of us know that on the evening of 15/3/13, Eurozone finance ministers agreed on an extraordinary course of action in response to Cyprus’ request for a bail-out of the State and its banking sector, both on the brink of apparent collapse. The political agreement reached at the ministers’ Eurogroup configuration, seeks to impose a levy on deposits with Cypriot banks, catching both Cypriot and foreign depositors (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Decision’).

Developments are of course constantly unfolding. Following fierce reactions to the Decision, the Eurogroup held an urgent teleconference on 18/3/13, resulting in a statement by its president, Jeroen Dijsselbloem. The statement sought to assure that deposits under EUR100.000 would be fully guaranteed in what is presented as an upholding of the Eurogroup’s ‘view’ that ‘small depositors should be treated differently from large depositors’. The issue is that the Eurogroup never expressed such a view in the first place. Nor did it bother itself with revisiting the various legal anomalies emanating from what it wants to present as a political decision enjoying the consensus of all Eurozone member states, but has in fact been a catastrophic step, irrespective of whether it is eventually passed into law by the Cypriot Parliament. Continue reading

Sturgeon revisited (yet again): Case C-11/11 Air France v Folkerts

Dr Jeremias Prassl

Regulation 261/2004 on common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights continues to trigger litigation in the highest Member State courts. A clear pattern has begun to emerge: following on from an airline’s persistent refusal to comply with compensation or care obligations, a preliminary reference indirectly challenges the validity and / or scope of the Regulation. The Court’s answer is nearly inevitably in favour of the passenger, confirming the validity of the Regulation and purposively interpreting its terms.

Facts and Questions Referred

Mr and Mrs Folkert had booked flights departing Bremen, Germany at 6:30 am, with a scheduled arrival time of 11:30pm in Asunción, Paraguy. Their initial flight was delayed by just under 2,5 hours, but due to two missed connections in Paris and São Palo this resulted in an overall arrival delay of 11,5 hours. The Folkerts brought what might appear (by now) to be a relatively straightforward claim for €600 in compensation pursuant to Article 7(1)(c) of the Regulation (flights in excess of 3,500km distance). Indeed, their case plainly falls within the ECJ’s previous ruling in Case C-402/07 Sturgeon that

passengers whose flights are delayed may rely on the right to compensation laid down in Areticle 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 where they suffer, on account of such flights, a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours, that is to say when they reach their final destination three hours or more after the arrival time originally scheduled by the air carrier [61]. Continue reading

The Cyprus Bailout, Deposit Guarantees, and the Single Market (Updated)

lindsethProf. Peter Lindseth

 [This is a slightly updated and modified version of a post that appeared on europaeus|law over the weekend.  It is cross-posted here with permission.]

We’re all monitoring the intense fallout from the announcement by the Eurogroup that the Cyprus bailout will be conditioned on an “upfront one-off stability levy” on deposits in Cypriot banks.  The levy – 9.9% on bank deposits exceeding 100,000 euros and 6.7% on anything below that – will take place on Tuesday after a bank holiday on Monday.

There will no doubt be much more to be said about this in the coming days and weeks, but we note the general expectation that the levy, as structured, will hit small depositors in Cyprus banks especially hard.  Moreover, we want to point out the potential impact that the bailout conditions will have on the single market, notably harmonized deposit guarantee schemes.  As Open Europe asked on its blog:

Does this move break EU rules on capital controls and/or deposit guarantees? As noted above, it seems that depositors will be blocked from withdrawing their funds from banks. For other EU depositors this surely amounts to a form of capital control – strictly forbidden under the EU Treaty. Furthermore, as Sharon Bowles MEP has been tweeting, this move makes a mockery of the current EU rules on deposit guarantees below €100,000. The Eurozone may protest that the bank shares given in exchange are of the same value, but this is a very thin argument. Either of these issues could be challenged at the European Court of Justice.”

Bowles, a Lib-Dem MEP and chair of the EP’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, has now issued a press release entitled “The Cyprus bailout deal is a disaster for EU rules andSingle Market principles“.  She writes:

“This grabbing of ordinary depositors’ money is billed as a tax, so as to try and circumvent the EU’s deposit guarantee laws. It robs smaller investors of the protection they were promised. If this were a bank, they would be in court for mis-selling.

“The lesson here is that the EU’s Single Market rules will be flouted when the Eurozone, ECB and IMF says so. At a time when many are greatly concerned that the creation of the ‘Banking Union’, giving the ECB unprecedented power, will demote the priorities of the Single Market, we see it here in action.

“Deposit guarantees were brought in at a maximum harmonising level so that citizens across the EU would not have incentive to move funds from country to country. That has been blown apart.

“What else will be blown apart when convenient? All the capital requirements we have slaved over, what about the new recovery and resolution rules? What does this mean for confidence in cross-border banking and resolution and preventing the fragmentation of the banking sector?

“When the dust has settled on this deal, which I hope it never does, we will see that the Single Market has been sold down the river for a shoddy price. All the worse as the consequences for Cyprus of the Greek bond haircuts were obvious.”

Continue reading

Protecting Democracy and the Rule of Law inside the EU; or: Why Europe Needs a Copenhagen Commission

Jan-Werner Mueller

Could there be a dictatorship inside the European Union?  If such a spectre appeared, should Brussels somehow step in to shore up democracy?  Or would this constitute an illegitimate form of meddling in the domestic affairs of countries which, after all, have delegated only specific powers to Europe – and not empowered Brussels to lecture Europeans from Lapland to Lampedusa on how popular rule is correctly understood, let alone to be a policeman for liberal democracy across the European continent?  All these are no longer theoretical questions: recent developments in Romani and especially in Hungary have put such challenges squarely on the agenda of European politics.

I have argued in a short book and in a paper for the Transatlantic Academy that it is legitimate for Brussels to act as a guardian of liberal democracy.   The problem is more of a practical nature: as of now, the EU has no convincing tool kit to deal with situations which probably not many Eurocrats – or, for that matter, European elites more broadly – ever foresaw.  To be sure, the repertoire of legal and political instruments the EU has at its disposal at the moment to exert pressure on Member States might occasionally work — but it can also appear arbitrary and opportunistic.  I propose extending this repertoire as well as the creation of a new kind of democracy watchdog – tentatively called the ‘Copenhagen Commission’ – which can raise a Europe-wide alarm about deteriorations in the rule of law and democracy. Continue reading

Seven Days in Europe

The EU’s full ban on testing cosmetics on animals came into force. As from Monday cosmetics tested on animals cannot be marketed in the EU. The Commission, having considered the impacts of the marketing ban, decided the development of cosmetics does not warrant animal testing.

Italy has been dominating European news this week. The country is in a diplomatic crisis with India after refusing to return two Italian marines who have been charged in India with the murder of two fishermen. The men had been allowed to visit their home country in order to vote in last month’s elections, but were ordered to return within four weeks to face trial. As the incident took place in international waters, Italy believes India has no jurisdiction. On Wednesday India’s Supreme Court ordered the Italian ambassador to not leave the country.   Continue reading

Akerberg and Melloni: what the ECJ said, did and may have left open

John Morijn

In the first of two posts on the CJEU’s important recent judgments in Akerberg and Melloni, John considers the Akerberg case and in particular its interpretation of article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

In dealing with Akerberg and Melloni in a coordinated way, the CJEU’s Grand Chamber took a conscious first step towards developing a general theory on how to apply the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). First, it engaged with a long running debate about the Charter’s scope of application with regard to Member States’ actions, interpreting the article 51(1) CFR wording of “only when implementing Union law”. Second,  it interpreted article 53 CFR which states that “nothing in the CFR shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights … as recognised by [principally] the ECHR and by the Member States’ constitutions”.

Union law insiders will probably recognise an expansionist streak in the ECJ’s approach in the first case, Akerberg, to equate “implementing Union law” to “acting within its scope”. For (national) human rights law practioners less familiar with Union law’s subtleties and simply wondering when the now binding Charter and its sometimes higher human rights standards apply, the ECJ may have done little more than re-word the dilemma in Union law Babylonian. In the second case, Melloni, in an effort to protect its understanding of Union law, the ECJ turned the wording and rationale of article 53 CFR completely on its head, practically positioning the CFR as a maximum rather than a minimum standard of human rights protection. Both cases seem to leave room for interpretation, however, allowing details of the general theory to be ironed out in future cases. But perhaps the main message of 26 February 2013 is that the ECJ left no doubts about the institution in charge of any such future ironings out: itself. Continue reading