The UK Supreme Court and EU law in the Legal Year 2016–2017 – Part 7

Aidan O’Neill QC

EU law and intellectual property

 Article17(2) of the CFR states unequivocally that:

“Intellectual property shall be protected”.

Post-Brexit, assuming the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is indeed repudiated as provided for under the Withdrawal Bill, the UK courts will be free to ignore Europe-wide consideration if so minded, and develop its own national approach.   The post-Brexit judicial economy might come to resemble that which currently applies in matters concerning patents in Europe.

In its Opinion 1/09,[1] the CJEU effectively vetoed, as incompatible with EU law and more particularly its position as the apex court and final arbiter in the EU on all issues of EU law, the proposals contained in a draft Agreement among the Member State, the EU and non-EU states who were also parties to the European Patents Convention (‘EPC’) and others for the establishment of a European and Community Patents Court.    The immediate response from the Member States has been to exercise “enhanced co-operation” directly among themselves to enter into a new international agreement which parallels but is not fully integrated into formal framework and structures of the European Treaties.  The Unified Patent Court Agreement (16351/12) seeks to create a new Unified Patent Court (UPC) for the settlement of disputes relating to European patents and European patents with unitary effect.   This agreement is open to accession by any Member State of the European Union. But, responding to the CJEU’s concerns, the Agreement is not open to states outside of the European Union.   The idea is that the Unified Patent Court shall become a shared common court among the Member States which contract into it, but will be subject to the same obligations under EU law as any national court of the Member States.  In this way the CJEU can rest assured that it will not be supplanted from its apex position. [2] The UPC will be subject to the jurisdiction of the CJEU as regards the interpretation and application of EU law relative to patents and may make preliminary references to it.     At the time of writing all the Member States other than Spain and Poland had acceded to the UPC Agreement.   But post-Brexit the UK will no longer be a Member State and therefore not able to participate in the UPC once it is set up.

In Actavis UK Limited v Eli Lilly and Company,[3] when considering whether or not pharmaceutical products manufactured by the appellants would infringe a European patent owned by the respondent, the Court looked at the approach to infringement in the courts of other EPC states, including the national courts of Germany, France, Italy and Spain to inform the Court’s own judgment.  In future patents cases doubtless the Court may refer to rulings of the UPC, but it will remain the final arbiter on this matter in the UK.

Whereas patents do not fall fully within the ambit of EU law, trade-marks do.[4]  M v R[5] concerned a prosecution of individuals who were alleged to have been involved in the bulk importation and subsequent sale within the EU of various branded goods manufactured in countries outside the single market, a proportion of which goods, at least, were not counterfeits but had been manufactured with the authorisation of the trade mark proprietor, albeit they had thereafter been disposed of without his authority (so-called grey goods).  It might be said that art 7(1) of the Trademarks Directive provides the authority for trade mark owners to be permitted to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have not been put on the EU single market under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.    Following the analysis of the Grand Chamber CJEU in Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson[6] this might be considered a sufficient connection with EU law to have allowed those being prosecuted to rely in argument on provisions of the Charter including: the freedom to conduct a business protected under art 16 of the CFR; the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions  protected under art 17(1) of the CFR; the presumption of innocence and right of defence protected by art 48 of the CFR; and the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties protected by art 49 of the CFR.  EU law was, however, the dog that did not bark in this instance.

This is an excerpt from a chapter in Daniel Clarry (ed), The UK Supreme Court Yearbook, Volume 8: 2016-2017 Legal Year (Appellate Press 2017).


[1] [2011] ECR I-1137.

[2] See Case C-147/13 Spain v. Council ECLI:EU:C:2015:299 where the CJEU Grand Chamber rejcted the application by Spain for the annulment of Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 which implemented enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection.  .  Council Decision 2011/167/EU of 10 March 2011 authorised enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection.

[3] [2017] UKSC 48.

[4] See eg Council Directive (EC) 2008/95 to approximate the laws of Member States relating to trade marks [2008] OJ L299/25 (‘Trademarks Directive’).

[5] [2017] UKSC 58, [2017] 1 WLR 3006.

[6] Case C-617/10 EU:C:2013:105 [2013] 2 CMLR 46 [21].

 

The UK Supreme Court and EU law in the Legal Year 2016–2017 – Part 6

Aidan O’Neill QC

EU private international law

 Clause 6(1) of the Withdrawal Bill, if enacted, will put an end to preliminary references from a UK court or tribunal. It provides as follows:

(1) A court or tribunal—

(a) is not bound by any principles laid down, or any decisions made, on or after exit day by the European Court, and

(b) cannot refer any matter to the European Court on or after exit day.

This ban on references to Luxembourg, if carried through, will effectively mean the end of the UK’s participation in the uniform approach to private international law across the EU which has been the cornerstone of the ‘fifth freedom’ of the EU, namely the free movement of judgments which has been facilitated by such measures as: the recast Brussels I (EU) Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgment in civil and commercial matters; the recast Insolvency Proceedings (EU) Regulation 2015/868; the Brussels II Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility; and the Maintenance Obligations Regulation (EC) 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations.

In AMT Futures Ltd v Marzillier, Dr Meier & Dr Guntner Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH,[1] the Court applied the provisions of the original Brussels I (EC) Regulation 44/2001 to hold that the English courts had no jurisdiction to consider a claim for damages against a German defendant for wrongfully inducing breach of contract by facilitating the bringing of damages claims in Germany by former clients of the plaintiff, allegedly in breach of the clients’ agreement to submit such disputes to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts.  The Court ruled that the relevant CJEU jurisprudence did not allow the grounds of jurisdiction in matters relating to a contract to be elided with those relating to tort.  The inconvenience of separating the contractual and tortious claims was said to be the price of achieving the certainty and good administration across the EU at which the Brussels I Regulation was aimed in relation to court disputes concerning civil and commercial matters.

Post-Brexit, assuming the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is indeed repudiated as provided for under the Withdrawal Bill, the UK courts will be free to ignore general Europe-wide considerations if so minded, and develop their own national approach.  This would be at the undoubted cost to the civil justice cooperation across Europe of the type which is currently dealt with by private international law EU Regulations.

This is an excerpt from a chapter in Daniel Clarry (ed), The UK Supreme Court Yearbook, Volume 8: 2016-2017 Legal Year (Appellate Press 2017).


[1] [2017] UKSC 13, [2017] 2 WLR 853.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Paving the way towards a very uncertain future

Phil Syrpis

Professor of EU law, University of Bristol

(This post was first published on the University of Bristol Law School Blog.  It is reproduced here with kind permission of the author.)

The stated aim of the, then Great, Repeal Bill was to provide clarity and certainty for citizens and businesses, and to ensure a functioning statute book on exit from the EU. The key statement of principle in the White Paper was as follows: ‘In order to achieve a stable and smooth transition, the Government’s overall approach is to convert the body of existing EU law into domestic law, after which Parliament (and, where appropriate, the devolved legislatures) will be able to decide which elements of that law to keep, amend or repeal once we have left the EU. This ensures that, as a general rule, the same rules and laws will apply after we leave the EU as they did before’ (for analysis, see here).

However, the continuity provided by what is now the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, published last week, must be seen in the context of the reality that leaving the EU will also require major constitutional and policy changes in a relatively short, and currently uncertain, time frame (see here). After all, the Government’s aim is that, as a result of Brexit, the UK will be able to decide which parts of EU-derived law to keep, and which to amend or repeal. A number of Brexit Bills, which will change the law in relation to, among others, immigration, trade, customs, agriculture and fisheries, were promised in the Queen’s speech. The clarity and certainty promised in the White Paper, which at first glance appear to provide comfort to citizens and businesses concerned over the effects of Brexit, are more elusive than ever. Continue reading

Brexit Negotiating Terms of Reference

Dr Iyiola Solanke

At their first meeting in Brussels today, Michel Barnier and David Davis agreed overall Terms of Reference for the forthcoming Brexit negotiations. The Terms of reference set out a general structure and schedule for negotiations between now and October 2017. After today’s formal opening, actual talks will begin in July. Round 1 will take place in the week commencing July 17th followed by Round 2 in the week of August 28th, Round 3 in the week of September 18 and Round 4 in the week of October 9th. We do not yet know what happens beyond that date.

Setting the pattern for future negotiations, the joint post-meeting press conference was held in English and French, with interpretation provided by the European Commission. All negotiations and working documents will be produced in these two languages. The negotiations themselves will take place on two levels – general plenary sessions and smaller group meetings. The document states that each round of negotiations ‘should’ comprise public officials of both sides only however this leaves scope for others, such as business leaders and bankers, to also take part. Names are not given, but Politico has helpfully produced a list of the key players on each side.

Plenary negotiating sessions will be co-chaired by so-called ‘Principals’ and/ or ‘Co-ordinators’ – presumably from the central team on each side. These persons will have overall responsibility both for keeping the process on track and providing advice. They will also have responsibility for a specific dialogue on Ireland/ Northern Ireland, launched today.  It is not clear who will lead/co-ordinate the smaller group meetings or how many there will be – the ‘Principals’ have discretion to create additional working groups, sub- groups or indeed organise ‘breakout sessions’ as required.

In total, just 3 negotiating groups were created today. Two are very specific: Citizens’ Rights and Financial Settlement. The latter will clearly deal with the Brexit Bill and the former will focus on the situation of EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in other parts of the EU. It is also to be hoped that it will deal with the situation of Zambrano carers whose rights to remain in the UK to look after their British citizens children also derive from EU law. The final negotiating group created today has a general remit and will focus on other Separation Issues.

The basis of the negotiations will be texts created by either side. There is no specific timeframe for sharing these materials – the document simply rather limply states that ‘Negotiation texts that are intended for discussion at any negotiating round should be shared at least one week in advance wherever possible.’ This is surprising – given the ever-decreasing timeframe, tighter rules on the exchange of documents might have been better.

The timeframe is also loose – the above-mentioned ‘Negotiation rounds’ will ‘in principle’ take place during one week in every month. However, this is a loose arrangement which can be departed from by mutual consent. Negotiators may also meet informally in between formal sessions to prepare negotiations. Continue reading

Brexit: a separate citizens’ rights agreement under Article 50 TEU

Stijn Smismans, Professor of EU Law, Cardiff University

Why a separate citizens’ rights agreement under article 50 is required

The European Council Guidelines for the Brexit negotiation adopted on 29th April 2017 (further referred to as Negotiation Guidelines), as well as the Council Directives for the negotiation adopted on 22nd May 2017 (further referred to as Negotiation Directives), show a clear EU commitment to defend the rights of the nearly five million people whose lives are most directly affected by Brexit, namely the EU citizens residing in the UK, and British citizens residing in the EU.  The Negotiation Directives clearly state that the withdrawal negotiations should ensure  ‘the necessary effective, enforceable, non-discriminatory and comprehensive guarantees’ and they favor a rather maximalist defense of the rights of these citizens (including judicial protection by the CJEU). The UK’s promises to protect the rights of these citizens are comparatively vague.  However, both the EU and the UK have agreed that dealing with the rights of these citizens is the first priority of negotiations. However, there is no procedural guarantee that these citizens would not end up as a bargaining chip.

The Negotiation Guidelines and Directives provide for a phased approach to the negotiations.  However, this phased approach aims primarily at separating the negotiation of the withdrawal settlement under Article 50TEU (phase 1) from the negotiation of an agreement on the future relationship between the UK and the EU (phase 2).  In addition to that, it provides for a second stage within the first phase (Article 50 withdrawal settlement).  In that second stage, the withdrawal negotiation can start to reflect on the potential scenarios for the future UK-EU relationship.  Article 50 requires ‘taking account of the framework for its [withdrawing Member State’s] future relationship with the Union’ when dealing with the withdrawal agreement.  However, the Guidelines state clearly that this second stage of the first phase will only start when the European Council has decided that there is ‘sufficient progress’ on the issues identified as priorities of the first phase.

Citizens’ rights have been identified as the first item on the agenda of the first phase of the negotiation process.   The proposed ‘phasing’ thus gives some level of separating citizens’ rights from other parts of the negotiation.  However, this is far from ring-fencing. The EU has taken the approach that as far as the withdrawal issues (phase 1) are concerned ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. This at least means that citizens’ rights issues might be traded off against other topics of the first phase of negotiation, such as the financial settlement and the Ireland-Northern Ireland border issue.  Moreover, they may even be influenced by the reflections about the future UK-EU relationship which will appear on the negotiation table as issues ‘to be taken into account’ prior to the finalisation of the Article 50 withdrawal agreement.  Hence, EU citizens in the UK and British in the EU remain fully at risk of becoming bargaining chips.

The proposed negotiation procedure entails two additional dramatic consequences for the 4.5 million citizens directly affected.  The principle ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ unnecessarily prolongs the uncertainty these people are living in.   Moreover, in the case that the withdrawal agreement fails, citizens will find themselves in a legal limbo with dramatic consequences.

The only solution to solve the uncertainty of 4.5 million people is to adopt an agreement on citizen’s rights at the start of the Article 50 negotiation, independently from other withdrawal issues.

So why has it not happened so far?

One can understand the EU’s reluctance to negotiate on citizens’ rights PRIOR to the triggering of Article 50.   The UK referendum was merely an internal affair as long as Article 50 had not been triggered.   Moreover, if negotiating a citizens’ rights agreement prior to Article 50 had been attempted, it would not have profited from the decision-making procedure of Article 50 (which allows for the agreement to be adopted via Qualified Majority in Council and consent by the EP, and thus not requiring ratification by national parliaments in the EU 27). Negotiation outside Article 50 would be more cumbersome since it may require ratification by all national parliaments.  Hence the ‘time advantage’ of starting negotiation prior to triggering Article 50 would immediately have been lost as the procedure itself would slow down the process.  Finally, the EU feared that negotiation on partial issues prior to the triggering of Article 50 would undermine the unity of the EU 27.

However, now that Article 50 has been triggered, there is no reason why a separate agreement on citizens’ rights cannot be negotiated prior to all other issues.

The moral argument in favor of that remains as strong as ever before.  The strategic argument of the EU that it would encourage ‘cherry-picking’ is also hardly convincing.  The EU has by now set out  its institutional framework, priorities and strategy for the negotiations.  It is no longer unprepared, and has the institutional mechanism in place to ensure unity in response to the UK in negotiations.  Moreover, arguments that a separate citizens’ rights agreement opens the way for cherry-picking are based on the wrong assumption.  Accepting ring-fencing for citizens’ rights does not create any obligation to do the same for other issues.  There is a strong moral argument to state: ‘a separate agreement will only be done on citizens’ rights given the human costs involved’.  As will be shown below that does not create any legal precedent for the EU to accept separate agreements on other issues.

The only remaining question then is whether it is legally possible. More precisely, the question is whether the rights of post-Brexit EU citizens can be legally ring-fenced from other negotiation topics and be safeguarded prior to the end of the withdrawal negotiation, and in a way that it stands even in failure of the latter.

To show whether ring-fencing is legally possible we need to address three questions:

  • Is it possible to adopt a separate agreement on citizens rights signed under Article 50?
  • How to ensure procedurally that the negotiation of these citizens’ rights, and of this separate agreement, is not mixed up with other Brexit negotiation issues (ring-fencing in the strict sense).
  • How to ensure that the agreement comes into force even if other aspects of the Brexit negotiation fail (safeguarding)

Is a separate agreement legally possible under Article 50 TEU?

As confirmed in Article 5 of the Negotiation Guidelines, Article 50 TEU confers on the Union an ‘exceptional horizontal competence to cover in this agreement all matters necessary to arrange the withdrawal. This exceptional competence is of a one-off nature and strictly for the purposes of arranging the withdrawal from the Union.’ There is no doubt that addressing the rights of the 4.5 million is inherently an issue of withdrawal, and can thus be dealt with via Article 50.  These are issues on which the EU has been able to act on behalf on the Member States so far, and this competence extends (thanks to Article 50) to dealing with all withdrawal aspects related to it.

However, Article 50 TEU talks about a withdrawal agreement in the singular. The question is then whether a separate agreement on citizens’ right under Article 50 is possible.  I will argue that the use of the singular in relation to ‘agreement’ does not exclude legally that the withdrawal could be composed of several agreements, as long as the objectives and spirit of Article 50 TEU are respected. Continue reading

The phoney war is over. Theresa May has triggered Article 50. The clock is ticking. But clarity and legal certainty remain elusive

Prof Phil Syrpis, Professor of EU Law (University of Bristol Law School)

In her letter to Donald Tusk the Prime Minister outlined the UK’s starting position in negotiations with the EU. The EU Council of Ministers responded by producing draft negotiating guidelines (to be confirmed by the European Council at the end of April). These guidelines create the framework within which negotiations on withdrawal, and those on the future relationship between the UK and the EU, will occur. Meanwhile, a White Paper on the Great Repeal Bill was presented to Parliament, promising on the one hand to repeal the European Communities Act (ECA) and end the supremacy of EU law in the UK, and on the other to convert the acquis communautaire into UK law, so that ‘EU-derived rights’ (as we will need to get used to calling them) will, as far as possible, be unaffected.

The opening exchanges between the UK and EU have generated a lot of comment. Much of it has focused on the unlikely subject of Gibraltar (Michael Howard’s crass evocation of the Falklands conflict will have done nothing to lower simmering tensions). In relation to the White Paper, most attention has been devoted to the role of Parliament and the devolved assemblies. Rather less attention has been paid to many of the EU law aspects. In this short note, I focus on those. I first consider what new light has been shed on the way in which the Article 50 negotiations will proceed, drawing attention to the host of issues which remain unanswered. I then consider the EU law questions raised by the repeal of the ECA, and the conversion of the acquis into UK law. Michael Ford has already commented on this blog on the applicability of judgments of the European Court of Justice in the post-Brexit era; so there is no more on that subject here.

My overarching concern is that the Government, in particular in the White Paper, has failed to provide a clear sense of the size of the task which lies ahead. It is impossible to know whether this is because the Government itself does not appreciate the magnitude of the challenge, or because it is trying to conceal the difficulties. The Government has, for months, struggled to articulate just what Brexit might mean, and has made a series of disparate promises which a range of different constituencies have, if so minded, been able to rely on, or cling to. It will now start making hard choices. It has not prepared the ground well.

Theresa May’s letter set a conciliatory tone, using much more constructive rhetoric than hitherto. She emphasised her desire to build a ‘new deep and special partnership’ with the EU. She expressed the belief that ‘it is necessary to agree the terms of our future relationship alongside those of our withdrawal from the EU’. And she made it clear that the ‘no deal’ scenario is ‘not the outcome which either side should seek’. This is not the tone avid Brexiteers had been expecting.

The EU responded with a draft of the negotiating guidelines which are to ‘define the framework for negotiations under Article 50’ (though note that the European Council, a little ominously, reserves to itself the power to ‘update these guidelines in the course of the negotiations as necessary’). Article 50 does not afford a role to the withdrawing state in the drafting or scope of these guidelines; like them or not, the UK will have to abide by them. The Council repeated ‘its wish to have the UK as a close partner in the future’. But it is immediately clear that the relationship will be very different to the one we have all become used to. In the very first paragraph of the draft guidelines there are references to ‘the integrity of the Single Market’ and to the fact that there ‘can be no “cherry picking”’, and a clear statement that a non-member of the Union ‘cannot have the same rights and enjoy the same benefits as a member’. The guidelines go on to say that withdrawal negotiations ‘will be conducted as a single package’; ‘individual items cannot be settled separately’; and ‘there will be no separate negotiations between individual Member States and the United Kingdom’ on matters pertaining to its withdrawal.

The disagreement relating to the sequencing of the negotiations will be one to watch over the coming weeks and months. Article 50 provides some guidance here, with paragraph 2 providing that the withdrawal agreement with, in this instance, the UK, shall be negotiated and concluded ‘taking account of the framework of its future relationship with the Union’. On the basis of this wording, I have argued that the European Council should have agreed to commit to negotiations with the UK in relation not only about a narrow withdrawal agreement, but also about a broader agreement on the future relationship between the UK and the EU (so that the substantive reality of Brexit is known by the end of the two year negotiating period). The EU has, however, opted for a phased approach to the negotiations, seeking first to ensure that there is an orderly withdrawal. In the light of the wording of Article 50, perhaps reluctantly it has conceded that ‘an overall understanding on the framework for the future relationship could be identified during a second phase of the negotiations’, adding that the EU and its Member States ‘stand ready to engage in preliminary and preparatory discussions to this end in the context of negotiations under Article 50 TEU, as soon as sufficient progress has been made in the first phase’ (see para.4). In this instance it appears as though the UK has the law on its side; but there is little it can do to force the EU to broaden the scope of the negotiations before it is ready to do so. Continue reading

The week that was

In between the celebrations for 60th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome and April Fool’s day, Day 1 of Britain’s exit from the EU began. On March 29th Sir Tim Barrow was despatched with a 6-page letter from Downing Street , which was ceremoniously handed over in front of the worlds cameras as he shook hands with European Council President Donald Tusk. The picture inevitably made front page news but in contrast to the media, markets failed to react either positively or negatively making Day 1 strangely anti-climactic – in effect more of a whimper rather than a bang. Nonetheless, the countdown has begun.

Day 2 brought a swift EU response in the form of Brexit Negotiating Guidelines. Despite expressing the deep regret that Brexit will now happen by March 29th  2019, the EU repeated its resolve to act as one. It set out core principles which also made clear that Britain’s desire for a UK-EU relationship of bits and pieces was delusional. Two phases for negotiation are set out: Phase 1 will focus on ‘disentanglement’, including consideration of the so-called ‘Divorce Bill’; Phase 2 will only begin when according to the European Council ‘sufficient progress’ has been made on Phase 1. Phase 2 of negotiations will include discussions only on the ‘overall understanding on the framework’ for the future relationship.  In another blow to Government plans, the Guidelines state that agreement on a future relationship can only be concluded when the UK becomes a ‘third country’ – work towards a free trade agreement can only begin once the UK is no longer a Member State of the EU. An LSE-Briefing Paper by Damian  Chalmers gives a clear overview of the challenges facing the Government negotiators.

Transitional arrangements can be considered, but it is unclear in which phase. What is clear is that during any transitional phase prolonging the EU acquis all Union regulatory, budgetary, supervisory and enforcement instruments and structures will continue to apply. However, transitional arrangements cannot provide a shelter for trade talks – as explained above, if this means that the UK remains a Member State, movement towards a free trade agreement with EU will be stalled. A transition period may therefore prove a hurdle to the conclusion of a free trade agreement or any future partnership in areas such as security and defence, terrorism, international crime. Transition is not the only hurdle – the EU has linked the application of any agreement between the UK and the EU in Gibraltar to a prior agreement between the UK and Spain. It is clear what lies behind this: 96% of residents on the Rock voted to remain in the EU. Nicola Sturgeon must be green with envy – the SNP would no doubt also welcome such protection.

The EU is also clear that the future partnership must include enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms that do not affect the Unions autonomy – there can be no doubt since Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR how jealously the CJEU will also guard its own powers. Thus it is hard to see how the UK can square this with its statement in the White Paper, published on Day 3, that the jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK will end when we leave the EU. Unless, of course, it plans to leave the EU without any agreement.

Day 3 saw the publication a White Paper on Legislating for the UK’s Withdrawal from the EU. The centrepiece of this is a ‘Great Repeal Bill’, setting out the government’s vision of legislating for withdrawal from the EU. The plan for the Great Repeal Bill is to provide for ‘minor changes’ – it will repeal the ECA 1972 and incorporate wholesale the EU acquis communitaire (the Treaties but not the Charter, EU Regulations and Directives including implementing and delegated Regulations and Directives, and all CJEU case law) into UK law, convert EU Regulations into domestic law (these will be known as EU-derived law) and finally create limited discretionary powers for creation of secondary legislation. This secondary legislation will enable necessary ‘corrections’ to laws that would not function properly outside of the EU. In order to have the power to make these corrections, the Bill proposes the introduction of a so-called ‘Henry VIII clause,’ although this may cause significant problems according to Lord Neuberger.

It is questionable whether all this amounts to a ‘minor change’. It seems that the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ will create more in UK law than it repeals. By March 2019, and for an undefined period of time there will be two sets of laws: UK law and ‘EU-derived law’ both of which will remain relevant until repealed. Repeal, conversion, and correction to fill gaps in EU derived laws will be an ongoing process. While the use of Henry VIII powers is defended as necessary to provide legal certainty, the Bill envisages that there will be flux and constant change. Thus the law may change more than once during the process as negotiations continue.

The CJEU is specifically mentioned: while according to the Bill the jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK will end, its case law will live on in EU-derived law: the White paper states that

‘as long as EU-derived law remains on the UK statute book, it is essential that there is a common understanding of what that law means…To maximise certainty, therefore, the Bill will provide that any question as to the meaning of EU-derived law will be determined in the UK courts be reference to the CJEU’s case law as it exists on the day we leave the EU…the Bill will provide that historic CJEU case law be given the same binding, or precedent, status in our courts as decision of our own Supreme Court’ (Paras 2.14 & 2.16)

EU law decided until March 29 2019 will therefore continue to influence law in the UK. Continue reading

Brexit Round-Up

From the News:

A week on from the rendition of Ode to Joy by SNP Parliamentarians in Westminster in response to the Brexit White Paper, the Speaker of the House, Mr John Bercow, finds himself in hot water for exercising his own freedom of speech.

Calls for his resignation have drowned out the perhaps more significant news that as far as the EU is concerned, the UK will not be able to negotiate its exit and future relationship with the EU concurrently and while the latter proceed, the UK will remain under the jurisdiction of the CJEU.

The Supreme Court finally responds to the media attacks on the judiciary during the Miller case: Lord Neuberger said in an interview on BBC Radio 4 that politicians were too slow to defend judges after Brexit case, especially as the vitriol aimed at judges ‘undermined rule of law.’

The division of the Supreme Court in Miller was perhaps not as surprising as its unanimity on the devolution questions. Eutopialaw’s own Aidan O’Neill considers the potentially disastrous consequences of this aspect of the decision for the UK in an article here.

While Article 50 has not yet been triggered, a report from the CIPD and The Adecco Group finds that labour and skills shortages are already appearing in sectors of the UK economy that employ a high number of EU nationals.

Trade integration continues under the shadow of Brexit: a day after MEPs approve CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement), Justine Trudeau tells the European Parliament that the whole world benefits from a strong EU.

Meanwhile back in the UK all eyes are focused on February 23, the day of by-elections in Stoke-on-Trent and Copeland – where the electorate voted by majorities of 70 % and 62% respectively to leave the EU.

All eyes will then turn to France, where Marine Le Pen has been given high odds of winning the French presidential election. Her father however has lost his case in Luxembourg against the European Parliament, which has taken action to recover monies paid to him and his parliamentary assistants.

Finally, BBC Radio 4 launches its series ‘Brexit – A Guide for the Perplexed’ on February 17th – will the Government tune in?

Recent Case Law from the CJEU:

Opinion of the Advocate General C-74/16 Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania

State aid: In the view of Advocate General Kokott, tax exemptions for Church-run schools do not, as a rule, breach the prohibition on State aid

Judgment of the Court of Justice C-219/15 Schmitt

Approximation of laws: The Court of Justice delivers its judgment in the case involving breast implants made of inferior quality industrial silicone

Judgment of the Court of Justice C-560/14 M v Minster for Justice and Equality

Claims for Subsidiary Protectionan applicant for subsidiary protection does not have the right to an interview but an interview must be arranged where specific circumstances render it necessary in order to examine the application with full knowledge of the facts.

Opinión C-3/15 Avis au titre de l’article 218, paragraphe 11, TFUE

Law governing the institutions: the EU, acting on its own, may conclude the Marrakesh Treaty on access to published works for persons who are visually impaired

Judgment of the Court of Justice C-562/15 Carrefour Hypermarchés SAS v ITM Alimentaire International SASU

Comparative advertising based on prices as between shops having different formats and sizes is unlawful in certain circumstances

Opinion of the Advocate General C-638/16 X and X

DFON: According to Advocate General Mengozzi, Members States must issue a visa on humanitarian grounds where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that a refusal would place persons seeking international protection at risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment

Judgment of the General Court T-646/13 Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe v Commission

Citizenship of the Union: The General Court annuls the Commission decision refusing registration of the proposed European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’

Law and Politics in the Supreme Court

Phil Syrpis, University of Bristol Law Schoolsyrpis

By a majority of 8 to 3, the Supreme Court held that in light of the terms and effect of the European Communities Act 1972, ‘the prerogative could not be invoked by ministers to justify giving Notice under Article 50… Ministers require the authority of primary legislation before they can take that course’ (para. 101). Within hours, the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, authorising the Prime Minister to trigger Article 50, was published. It passed through the House of Commons unscathed yesterday. A White Paper, setting out the Government’s plan for Brexit, such as it is, has also been published.

The purpose of this post is very specific. My aim is not to analyse the judgment, the Bill or the White Paper. That has been done elsewhere. Instead, my aim is to begin to explore the relationship between law and politics, and between Parliament, the executive and the judiciary, taking as a starting point the judgments in the Supreme Court. The judges are, at times, careful not to trespass into the political realm. Nevertheless, their findings are informed and influenced, in a number of ways, by the political context. There are, moreover, important differences between the approaches adopted by the majority and the minority, including differences relating to the judges’ understanding of the legal process of Brexit. It is hoped that inconsistencies between and within the judgments will provoke further academic consideration of the extent to which Courts should intrude into, or take cognisance of, the political realm; and of the extent to which constitutional safeguards are matters of substance or form. But, at this febrile political time, the clearest conclusion is that by failing to answer key questions of law, the Court has done a disservice to Parliament, thereby contributing, not towards the provision of a clear framework within which politicians are able to address the realities of Brexit, but to the pervasive sense of confusion.

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Miller Judgment breaches UKSC duties under EU law in disservice of UK Parliament

ASG smallDr Albert Sanchez-Graells

The UK Supreme Court (UKSC) has today handed down its Judgment. It has done so in a way that both infringes its duties under EU law and does a disservice to the UK Parliament.

Breach of UKSC’s duties under EU law

One of the difficult legal issues on which the Brexit litigation hinged concerned the interpretation of Art 50 TEU and, in particular, the revocability of a notice given under Art 50(2) TEU. The interpretation of this point of law falls within the exclusive competence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) under Art 263 TFEU. Interestingly, the UKSC stressed this monopoly of interpretation as a key element of EU law at para [64]. However, the UKSC has violated the ECJ’s monopoly of interpretation of the EU Treaties by accepting the parties’ commonly agreed position on the irrevocability of an Art 50(2) TEU notice at [26] of the Miller Judgment.

In doing so, the UKSC has infringed its obligation under Art 267(3) TFEU to engage in a preliminary reference to the ECJ concerning the interpretation of Art 50 TEU (for legal background see here and here). This cannot be saved by an argument that, under domestic procedural rules (or conventions), the UKSC had the possibility of taking this approach–and effectively dodging one of the most complex and unpredictable legal issues on which the litigation rested.

There are several reasons for this, but the primary one is that, as matter of EU law, a preliminary reference by the highest court of an EU Member State is unavoidable where the interpretation of EU law is necessary to enable it to give judgement–or, in other words, where the judgment relies on a given interpretation of EU law. In my view, it is beyond doubt that the UKSC Miller Judgment is based on the interpretation that an Art 50(2) TEU notice is irrevocable, and that this represents the legally binding view of the majority judgment, regardless of the attempt to save the UKSC’s view on this point in para [26] — or, in other words, it is not (logically, legally) true that the UKSC’s Miller Judgment operates ‘without expressing any view of our own on either point‘ (ie regarding the revocability or not of the Art 50(2) TEU notice). There are explicit indications of this interpretation in paras [59], [81] and [92] (see here for more detailed analysis of the latter).

In view of the relevance of the points of irrevocability of the Art 50(2) TEU notice, it is clear to me that the UKSC had an obligation to seek the interpretation of this provision by the ECJ and that, in not doing so, it has breached EU law. Moreover, beyond what some may consider a highly technical or academic point, by not seeking this clarification the UKSC has also done a disservice to the UK Parliament. Continue reading