My last postspeculated on how the political conflicts surrounding the Eurozone crisis could result in both “more” and “less” Europe at the same time—“more” to contain the crisis and achieve stabilization; “less” to compensate resistant Member States whose increasingly Eurosceptical publics would like to see, in exchange, some tangible curtailing of other parts of supranational authority.
My speculations for the most part ran to the institutional—increased roles for national parliaments, a new European subsidiarity court (a “European Conflicts Tribunal”), and the like. Obviously the politics of the situation remain highly fluid, with Slovenian governments falling and Slovakian coalition partners apparently refusing to fall into line behind their government, just to name a few instances. Predicting in advance what deals will be needed to overcome the many hurdles the crisis will throw up is undoubtedly difficult. Small countries might be susceptible to pressure from big ones, pure and simple. But what can we expect of the back-and-forth among the bigger member states themselves? If, for example, European (and particularly French) banks need recapitalization or perhaps even help from some kind of European TARP program, might this strengthen the hand of those who seek reconsideration of other big-ticket items in overall supranational spending in Europe?